ABSTRACT
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides a global public good when it lends emer-gency balance-of-payments support to countries that otherwise could not access such financing at comparable terms. No country borrows from the IMF lightly, and only does so as a last resort in the face of an economic crisis. In exchange for IMF lending, governments sur-render some sovereignty, self-determination of their economic policies, and implicitly admit that the government, on its own, could not manage the travails through which it is going. A lesser-known but also costly trade-off is that the IMF imposes significant surcharges – akin to the penalty rates imposed by banks – on countries with large borrowings from the IMF that are not paid back within a relatively short time. Indeed, IMF surcharges are pro-cyclical financial penalties imposed on countries precisely at a time when they can least afford them. This brief note examines the economic implications of the surcharges from a global distributive perspective. In so doing, the authors stress the need to eliminate excessive surcharges in the COVID-19 era and call for a more fundamental reform of IMF financing. © 2022 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
ABSTRACT
Based on a survey of 2500 US adults, we show that serious illness or job losses caused by the COVID-19 pandemic increase support for temporary progressive levies or structural progressive tax reform, controlling for socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. People who reveal preferences for spending items (more on police, military, border protection; less on education, health, environment) that are associated with communitarian (rather than universalist) moral perspectives show generally weaker support for progressive reforms, but more of them change their views following personal experience. The results are consistent with previous findings that economic upheavals can mold individuals' views on policy matters. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10797-021-09700-2.